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1Abstract
In a recent paper, Michael Kiley argued that the Calvo model of
price adjustment is both quantitatively and qualitatively di⁄er-
ent from the Taylor model. What we show is that Kiley (along
with most other people) are choosing the wrong parameteriza-
tion to compare the two models. In e⁄ect they are comparing
the average age of Calvo contracts with the completed length of
Taylor contracts. When we compare the average age of Taylor
contracts with the average of Calvo, the di⁄erences become much
smaller and easier to understand. We also show that autocorre-
lation of output can be larger in a Taylor economy than in the
age-equivalent Calvo economy.
21 Introduction
"Comparison of these models is simple. Suppose that the
average length of time between price changes for a ￿rm in each
model are equal (N = ￿￿1), which is the standard assumption
used throughout the literature"
In a recent thoughtful paper Kiley (2002), Michael Kiley compares the two
standard models of price adjustment: Calvo1 and Taylor. Kiley argues quite
forcefully that whilst "previous research suggests that partial adjustment
and staggering imply similar dynamics, at least in reduced form models...",
he ￿nds otherwise: "the dynamics are both qualitatively and quantitatively
di⁄erent across the two pricing speci￿cations when the models are calibrated
with identical frequencies of price adjustment". We show that existing
comparisons between Taylor and Calvo are inconsistent and do not compare
like with like2. Once the correct comparison is made, there are indeed
di⁄erences between Taylor and Calvo, but they are much less than Kiley
argues for.
1We exclude Rotemberg￿ s partial adjustment model, since this applies to the aggregate
price level directly and is not derived from microfoundations.
2See Kiley for a complete list of references.
3How should we compare Taylor and Calvo contracts? There are three
obvious criteria: the average length of completed contracts (the contract
lifetime); the average age of contracts (age since birth); the average frequency
of price adjustment. There are also more sophisticated criteria. Calvo
contracts are de￿ned by the reset probability ￿: Taylor contracts by their
length N. You can choose some property of a speci￿c macroeconomic model
(e.g. autocorrelation in output) and choose ￿ and N so that this property is
the same for both models of price-setting. Let us go through each of the three
simple criteria and see how the comparison should be made. The notation
we use is exactly the same as in Kiley (2002).
1.1 The average age of contracts: A
If we consider a Taylor model with N period contracts, in which there are N






For example, 2￿period contracts have an average age of 1:5 = (1 + 2)=2:
In a Calvo model with reset probability ￿, the average age of contracts





So, suppose we want to choose a pair f￿;Ng such that the average ages








Thus, for example, suppose we have 2￿period Taylor contracts, then
￿ = 2=3 will give the same average age (1:5). For 4￿period Taylor contracts
the avaerage age is 2:5 and the corresponding reset probability ￿ = 0:4.
1.2 The Average Lifetime of Contracts: N
What is the average lifetime of a contract in the Calvo and Taylor models?
This is simple in the Taylor model: it is de￿ned in terms of completed con-
tract length, N. In an N￿period contract Taylor model, we know that all
contracts last for N periods. In the Calvo model, however, to our knowl-
edge no macroeconomist has derived the distribution of completed contract
lengths. We know the age distribution: the steady-state proportion of ￿rms
having age s is given by ￿s
￿s = ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
s￿1 : s = 1:::1
5However, for each age s, a proportion (1 ￿ ￿) that do not reset prices now will
go on to survive at least another another period. In fact, the hazard/reset
probability is constant in the Calvo model: however old the contract, it is
still expected to live for another ￿￿1 periods. Since the average age is ￿￿1, it
follows that the expected average lifetime of the population of contracts will
be about 2￿￿1. In fact it turns out that the distribution mean is actually a
little less because we have measured time in integers starting with 1. Hence
we have (proof in the appendix):
Proposition 1 With a constant hazard rate ￿, the steady-state distribution




2N (1 ￿ ￿)
N￿1 :N = 1:::1 (4)
which has mean NC = 2￿￿
￿
So, the mean contract lifetime in a Calvo model is about twice the average
age. This makes perfect sense. In steady state you will (on average) tend to
observe contracts half way through their life. Note that with Taylor contracts,
there is exactly the same relationship:
N = 2A ￿ 1
6For example, with two period Taylor contracts, N = 2 and AT = 1:5. With
Calvo, AC = ￿￿1, NC = 2￿￿1 ￿1. Thus, if we seek to compare Taylor and
Calvo in terms of either average age or completed lifetimes, we have exactly
the same criterion: (3) above. Most researchers have wrongly compared the
average age of Calvo contracts with the lifetime of Taylor contracts, which is
clearly inconsistent and almost 100% o⁄ in order of magnitude.
1.3 The Average Frequency of Price Adjustment
The third criterion of comparison is the average frequency of price adjust-
ment. We would argue that this is the least satisfactory. The key factor here
is that the average frequency of price adjustment is very much a⁄ected by the
distribution of contract lengths and their timing. In the Calvo model, the
average frequency of price adjustment is a de￿ning parameter of the model:
￿. With the Taylor model, the average frequency of price adjustment is
N￿1. Clearly, if we set ￿ = N￿1, then we are in e⁄ect comparing a Calvo
economy with the average age of contracts ￿￿1 equal to the average lifetime
of the contracts in the Taylor economy. Put another way, the average lifetime




C = 2N ￿ 1
How can this be possible? The explanation is simple. There is a distribution
of contract lengths in the Calvo economy given by (2). Now, on average if
we look at the contracts that will last for N periods, N￿1 will reset their
prices each period in steady state. That is, the longer living contracts will
turn up less often because they will reset their prices less often. If a contract
lasts 100 periods, over its lifetime it will have changed its price on average
with a frequency 1=100.
Thus if we compare the Calvo and the Taylor economy, the average fre-
quency of price adjustment means something very di⁄erent. In the Taylor
economy, all contracts have the same lifetime. In the Calvo there is a distrib-
ution, with plenty of longer contracts surviving. These longer term contracts
only change price infrequently, and do not turn up in the data as changing
price. Comparing the average frequency of price changes when the two cases
have such di⁄erent distributions is a largely meaningless exercise.
82 Explaining Kiley￿ s Results
There are two lessons we want the reader to take from this paper:
Lesson 1 When you compare a Taylor and a Calvo economy, you must
compare like with like. Choose f￿;Ng according to (3), so that both
the average age and the average lifetime are the same.
Lesson 2 If you compare Taylor and Calvo economies that have the same
average age/lifetime, the di⁄erences between the two still exist, but
are smaller. Calvo will tend to be more persistent. That is because
although the average age/lifetime is the same, there is a distribution.
As we show in Dixon and Kara (2004), for a given mean, if there are
longer contracts this tends to make the economy behave with more
persistence.
Taken together, these lessons support Kiley￿ s original point: even when
you get the right comparison between the two types of contract (the same av-
erage age), there is still a di⁄erence. Although Kiley is wrong in magnitude,
he is right in his qualitative analysis of the di⁄erences.
92.1 Relative Price Distortions
Kiley quite rightly points out that relative price distortions are greater in the
Calvo model. He derives the steady state welfare loss in Taylor and Calvo
in equations (16) and (17) on page 290. He then asks the question: in this
model, what values of f￿;Ng will give the same welfare loss? He gives one
pair: we also provide the corresponding average ages and lifetimes (to 2 s.f.)
f￿ = 0:58;N = 4g
￿
AC = 1:72;AT = 2:5
￿
￿
NC = 2:5;N = 4
￿
(5)
Now, we can see that the welfare loss is equated with a reset probability
that implies a lower average age and average lifetime, but far less than Kiley
thinks. This is because, along with the rest of the literature he thinks of
Calvo in terms of age and Taylor in terms of lifetimes. Thus ￿ = 0:25 gives
an average age of 4 quarters, but average lifetime of 7. To get an average
lifetime of 4 requires ￿ = 0:4. Thus, Kiley is correct, but the di⁄erence
between the two models is less than he states.
In fact, things become even clearer when you correctly compare the mod-
els by equating average ages. If we take Kiley￿ s measures of the welfare
loss, (15) and (16), these are the variances of prices under Calvo and Taylor.
10Kiley states: " For..:N = 2, the welfare losses under the Calvo model are
eight times the losses under the Taylor speci￿cation; for N = 3, the losses
under Calvo are nine times those under the Taylor speci￿cation, and as N
increases further, the gap implied in welfare losses increases" (Kiley 2002,
p. 290-291). In fact, the magnitude of the relative welfare loss is much
smaller, and does not vary with N at all. Furthermore, we can ￿nd a simple
relationship between the contract lengths in Taylor and Calvo that equate
the welfare loss.
Proposition 2 For all N = 1:::1;The welfare loss in the Calvo speci￿cation
is three times the welfare loss in the Taylor speci￿cation when we choose ￿
to equate average age of contracts. The average lifetime NC in Calvo that












3Without loss of generality, we set ￿2 = 1:
11Now, if we choose ￿ = 2
N+1 and substitute out ￿ in Calvo(￿); the Calvo




which is precisely three times as large as Taylor for all N: We can then chooses
NC so that Calvo(NC) =Taylor(N) to equate welfare losses.
2.2 Dynamic Response to Monetary Shocks
Kiley next goes on to look at the persistence of output and price responses
to monetary shocks. He chooses the pair f￿ = 0:5;N = 2g, "the standard
calibration in a calvo model that would typically be compared to a two-period
staggering model". Lesson 1 tells us that this is confusing age an lifetimes.
The correct comparison is the pair f￿ = (2=3);N = 2g, which gives the same
average age and average life across the two models. In this case, we show
Fig 1 which corresponds to Kiley￿ s Figure 1
Figure 1 here.
The Calvo model with ￿ = 2=3 is indeed more persistent than the Taylor
model with N = 2, but the di⁄erence is less marked (particularly for smaller
values of b). As we argue in Dixon and Kara (2004), the reason for this
12is that the longer term contracts present in the Calvo distribution tend to
make the economy behave more persistently.
Figure 2 here
If we look at Figure 2, Kiley calculated for each Taylor model with N =
2:::8 the value of ￿￿1 that gives the same autocorrelation4 in output, for
di⁄erent values of b;the elasticity of output with respect to marginal cost5.
We have simply superimposed the equation (3) onto Kiley￿ s ￿gure 2. We also
depict the "spurious" relation N = ￿￿1. The important point is that once
you realize where the true age-equivalent line lies, all of the three functions
lie close to it. They are all a long way from the N = ￿￿1 line. Furthermore,
for values of b = 2 and b = 1, the di⁄erence between the autocorrelation at
empirically relevant magnitudes (N ’ 4) is not at all great. When b = 0:25,
the autocorrelation is always equated with a younger Calvo economy, which
is about 33% younger than the Taylor economy. So again, Kiley has got the
right qualitative result, but the magnitudes are di⁄erent.
4Note that although the autocorrelation is equated, when b ￿ 1, in the Taylor model
the output response is negative at some point. This shape of the time path makes the
Taylor model less plausible when b ￿ 1.
5In fact the lines were incorrectly labelled in the original article: we have corrected this.
133 Conclusion
In this paper, we argue for a consistent basis for comparing Taylor and Calvo
contracts. We argue that the correct criterion is that the average age across
the two should be equated, which his equivalent to equating the average
lifetime. This is di⁄erent to the current and almost universal norm, where
the average frequency of price adjustment is used. This leads to a model
where the average age of a Calvo contract is equated to the average lifetime
of a Taylor contract. Yet, the average age will be almost half the average
lifetime in both models. Whilst Taylor and Calvo are very di⁄erent models
at the conceptual level and lead to di⁄erent sorts of behavior, the di⁄erences
are much less than appear when you proceed from the wrong starting point.
Overall, Kiley argued that other authors were wrong to think that Calvo
and Taylor are similar. In this he is certainly right: the Calvo model has a
distribution of contract lengths which makes it very di⁄erent form the Taylor
economy where all contracts have the same length. However, he is using the
standard practice of comparing the average age of the Calvo economy with
the average lifetime of the Taylor economy. This makes the di⁄erences look
much larger than they actually are. The conlusion we would draw for empir-
ical work is that the Calvo model cannot be used as a simple approximation
14to the Taylor model, even when you choose ￿ to equate ages. The presence
of long contracts can lead to more presistence and price dispersion.
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5 Appendix: Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Suppose we want to ￿nd the proportion of contracts that last ex-
actly N periods. Clearly, we can exclude all contracts that have lasted
more than T: Consider the steady-state Calvo distribution of durations s :
￿s
i = ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
s￿1 :s = 1:::1 The corresponding distribution of periods. For




i￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
N￿s = ￿
2 (1 ￿ ￿)
N￿1
15summing this over all durations s ￿ N yields
￿N = ￿
2N (1 ￿ ￿)
N￿1
The mean completed contract length is
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16Figure 1: Persistence under Calvo and Taylor
17Figure 2: Correspondence between ￿￿1 and Contract Length
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